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I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, I published an article in the Marquette Intellectual
Property Law Review titled, “Trademark Exhaustion in the European
1
Union: Community-Wide or International? The Saga Continues.” In
that article, I described the development of the principle of trademark
exhaustion in the European Union (EU) and analyzed the interplay
among trademark protection, trademark territoriality, and the
treatment of the parallel importation of gray market products—
unauthorized genuine goods imported from foreign countries—under
Article 7 of the Trademark Directive (Article 7). Article 7 was the first
provision that directly addressed the exhaustion of trademark rights in
2
the EU and harmonized the national laws of EU Member States.
During the late 1990s, the main question in this area was primarily
3
whether the language of Article 7(1) permits the importation into a EU
Member State of gray market products exclusively when the products
4
have been put into the market in the European Economic Area (EEA)
1. Irene Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union: Community-Wide or
International? The Saga Continues, 6 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 47 (2002) [hereinafter
Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union].
2. Article 7 of Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 (EEC), now replaced by
European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/95, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25 (EC) [hereinafter
Trademark Directive]. For a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Trademark
Directive and the drafting process of Article 7 on the exhaustion of trademark rights, see
Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 60. The same
principle was repeated verbatim in Article 13 of the Community Trademark Regulation. See
Article 13 of Council Regulation 40/94, Dec. 20, 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, 1994
O.J. (L 011) 1 (EC), now replaced by Council Regulation 207/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1 (EC)
[hereinafter CTM Regulation]. On the developments of the principle of trademark
exhaustion in the European Union [hereinafter EU], see Friedrich-Karl Beier, Industrial
Property and the Free Movement of Goods in the Internal European Market, 21 I.I.C. 131
(1990) [hereinafter Beier, Industrial Property]; Friedrich-Karl Beier, The Doctrine of
Exhaustion in EEC Trademark Law—Scope and Limits, 10 I.I.C. 20 (1979) [hereinafter
Beier, Exhaustion in EEC Trademark Law]; Herman Cohen Jehoram, Harmonising
Intellectual Property Law Within the European Community, 23 I.I.C. 622 (1992); Ulrich
Löwenheim, Trademarks and European Community Law, 9 I.I.C. 422 (1978); Willem Mak,
Trademarks and the European Common Market, 6 I.I.C. 29 (1975).
3. Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive provides that trademark owners cannot
“prohibit [the] use [of a mark] in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the
Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.” Trademark
Directive, supra note 2, at art. 7(1).
4. The adoption of the Agreement for the European Economic Area (EEA) of May 2,
1992, extended this principle to the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) countries
joining the EEA (Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein). See Annex XVII and Article 2(1) of
the Protocol to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, Jan. 3, 1994, O.J. (L 1) 3,
which extends the effect of Article 7 of the Trademark Directive to the EEA from January 1,
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or whether, instead, the provision also permits the importation of gray
market products when the products have first been distributed outside
5
the EEA. Although Article 7(1) states that trademark rights have to be
considered exhausted with respect to products that are “put on to the
market in the Community” (Community-wide or EEA exhaustion), the
provision does not expressly exclude, in fact, the possibility for
individual Members States to extend this principle to products put into
6
the market outside the EEA (International exhaustion).
As I described in my 2002 article, this ambiguity led to several years
of heated debate over the geographical application—Community-wide
7
or International?—of the principle of trademark exhaustion in the EU.
In turn, because of this ambiguity, national courts repeatedly referred
questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or
Court) to clarify the interpretation of Article 7(1), namely, whether
individual Member States could apply the broader standard of
8
international exhaustion within their national territories. In the late
1990s and early 2000s, the CJEU then issued a series of decisions, in
which the Court invariably stated that Article 7(1) had to be interpreted
as establishing a general principle of Community-wide trademark
exhaustion to be applied in all Member States. This principle, the Court
repeated, was not just a minimum standard, but the exclusive standard
1994. For a more elaborated analysis of the relationship between free movement of products
and trademark exhaustion in free trade areas, see Irene Calboli, Market Integration and (The
Limits of) The First Sale Rule In North American and European Trademark Law, 51 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1241 (2011) [hereinafter Calboli, Market Integration].
5. See Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 60–66.
6. Id. at 49, fn. 8 (noting that the Court of Justice of the European Union “developed
the principle of Community-wide exhaustion independently” and that “the laws of some
countries, such as Germany, the Benelux Countries, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway,
generally accepted the principle of ‘international exhaustion,’ while other European
jurisdictions, such as France, Italy, and Spain, opted for the principle of ‘national
exhaustion’”). See also Nicholas Shea, Does the First Trade Mark Directive Allow
International Exhaustion of Rights?, 10 E.I.P.R. 463, 463 (1995) (recounting the
disagreements over the interpretation of the provision and the geographical application of the
principle of trademark exhaustion in the EU).
7. Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 60–66.
8. See Case C-335/96, Silhouette Int’l Schimed Gmbh & Co. KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 30 I.I.C. 920 (1998); Case-173/98, Sebago, Inc. v. GB-Unic SA, 2
C.M.L.R. 1317 (1999); Joined Cases C-414-416/99, Zino Davidoff SA v. A & G Imports Ltd.,
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Tesco Stores Ltd., and Levi Strauss & Co. v. Costco Wholesale UK
Ltd., 2001 E.C.R. I-8691. Professor F. K. Beier, the Director of the Max-Planck Institute for
Intellectual Property, Competition, and Tax Law also supported the position that individual
Member States could adopt a broader standard. See Beier, Industrial Property, supra note 2,
at 156–60.
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for trademark exhaustion for all Member States, including those
previously practicing international exhaustion within their national
9
territories.
Despite these decisions, in the early 2000s European
institutions and interested parties continued nonetheless to consider
whether a change from EEA-wide exhaustion toward international
trademark exhaustion could be possible or desirable within the EU
10
(EEA).
Ultimately, however, after several rounds of consultations
between European institutions, consumer associations, and
representatives of the industry, no change was suggested to the text of
Article 7(1). The principle of EEA-wide exhaustion was thus confirmed
11
as the only applicable principle within the territory of the EEA or, as it
12
has often been defined by commentators, “Fortress Europe.”
Hence, even if the CJEU’s decisions seemed to resolve the issues
related to the territorial application of the principle of trademark
exhaustion in the EU (EEA), some important developments have
continued to characterize this area. Notably, during the past decade,
national courts have referred additional questions to the CJEU
regarding the interpretation of Article 7, primarily with respect to the
interpretation of the notion of “trademark owner’s consent” in the
language of Article 7(1). In particular, national courts have asked the
CJEU to clarify under what circumstances trademark owners should be
deemed to “have consented” to the distribution of the products into the
EEA market under Article 7(1), and, thus, have exhausted the ability to
9. See Silhouette, 30 I.I.C. 920. In Silhouette, the CJEU ruled that “[n]ational rules
providing for exhaustion of trade-mark rights in respect of products put on the market
outside the EEA under that mark by the proprietor or with its consent are contrary to Article
7(1).” Id. at ¶ 31. For discussions of this case, see Jochen Pagenberg, The Exhaustion
Principle and “Silhouette” Case, 30 I.I.C. 19 (1999); Thomas Hays, The Silhouette Case: The
European Union Moves to the Highest Common Denominator on the Gray Market Question,
88 TRADEMARK REP. 234 (1998); Thomas Hays & Peter Hansen, Silhouette is not the Proper
Case Upon Which to Decide the Parallel Importation Question, 1998 E.I.P.R. 277. The Court
confirmed this position in Sebago, (1999) C.M.L.R. 1317 and in Zino Davidoff & Levi Strauss,
2001 E.C.R. I-8691. But see Case C-306/96, Javico Int’l & Javico AG v. Yves Saint Laurent
Parfums SA, 1998 E.C.R. I-1983 (where the CJEU adopted a different position based upon
the antitrust provisions of the EC Treaty).
10. Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 83. See
also Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights: Working Document from the Commission Services,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/intprop/indprop/exhaust.htm (Dec. 9, 1999)
[hereinafter Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion].
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Herman Cohen Jehoram, Prohibition of Parallel Imports Through
Intellectual Property Rights, 30 I.I.C. 495, 503 (1999); Carl Steele, “Fortresse Europe” for
Trademark Owners, 1998 Trademark World 14 (Aug. 1998).
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enforce their trademark rights with respect to the further distribution of
13
those products. In addition, national courts have asked the CJEU to
clarify the language of Article 7(2) of the Trademark Directive, and
specifically what constitutes a “legitimate reason” under Article 7(2) to
limit the application of the principle of trademark exhaustion and to
oppose the further circulation of marked products after their first sale in
the market, even in instances where the products have been first
14
distributed into the market in the EEA.
In this Essay I continue to explore, ten years after my 2002 article,
15
the development of the principle of trademark exhaustion in the EU.
In particular, I analyze the recent jurisprudence of the CJEU on the
application of Article 7 and recount the most relevant trends in the
recent CJEU’s decisions in this area. Although the focus of this Essay is
primarily descriptive, I offer some critical considerations in the light of
recent CJEU’s decisions. I thus argue that in its recent line of cases, the
CJEU seems increasingly willing to shrink, de facto, the application of
the principle of trademark exhaustion not solely to products imported
from outside the EEA, but also to intra-EEA trade. Most notably, I
highlight that the CJEU seems to have accepted a narrow interpretation
of the notion of trademark owners’ “consent” under Article 7(1) of the
Trademark Directive. I also argue that the CJEU seems to have
adopted an alarmingly broad interpretation of what can constitute a
13. See discussion infra Part II.
14. Article 7(2) of the Trademark Directive provides that trademark exhaustion “shall
not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further
commercialization of the goods . . . .” Trademark Directive, supra note 2, at art. 7(2).
15. This Essay focuses exclusively on the analysis of the recent decisions of the Court
of Justice of the European Union [hereinafter CJEU or Court] with respect to the principle
of trademark exhaustion, notably the interpretation of Article 7 of the Trademark Directive.
Because of its limited scope, this Essay only aims to provide a description and some limited
criticism of these decisions. Similarly, this Essay neither addresses relevant issues related to
the relationship between the free movement of goods and parallel trade, nor elaborates on
the economic aspects, positive and negative, of parallel imports for corporations and national
economies. Finally, this Essay does not address the interplay between the application of the
principle trademark exhaustion and the enlargement of the European Union during the past
decade. Generally, on the principle of trademark exhaustion, see Friedrich-Karl Beier,
Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade, 1 I.I.C. 48 (1970) [hereinafter Beier,
Territoriality of Trademark Law]; Christopher Heath, Parallel Imports and International
Trade, 28 I.I.C. 623 (1997); John C. Hilke, Free Trading or Free-Riding: An Examination of
the Theories and Available Empirical Evidence on Gray Market Imports, 31 WORLD
COMPETITION L & ECON. REV. 75 (1988); Herman Cohen Jehoram, Prohibition of Parallel
Imports Through Intellectual Property Rights, 30 I.I.C. 495 (1999); E.C. Vandenburgh, The
Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods is not a Trademark Problem, 49
TRADEMARK REP. 707 (1959).
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“legitimate reason” to oppose trademark exhaustion under Article 7(2),
especially to protect famous marks and luxury goods against
unauthorized trade by third party importers, still within the EEA. This
trend, I conclude, is troubling and may negatively impact the principle
of free movement of goods within the EU/EEA. Furthermore, it grants
trademark owners (primarily the owners of famous marks) an
increasingly absolute right to control the distribution of their marked
products in the after-sale market—precisely what the principle of
trademark exhaustion is supposed to prevent—to the detriment of
consumers and market competition.
II. RECENT DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION ON TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION
In this Part, I offer an overview of the most recent decisions issued
by the CJEU on the interpretation of Article 7 of the Trademark
Directive with particular attention to the notion of “trademark owner’s
consent” under Article 7(1) and the concept of “legitimate reasons” that
trademark owners can raise to oppose the further commercialization of
the marked products after their distribution into the EEA under Article
7(2).
A. Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel v. Diesel S.p.A.
16

As I pointed out in my 2002 article, the CJEU first addressed the
interpretation of “consent” under Article 7(1) of the Trademark
17
18
Directive in Sebago and Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss in the late
1990s and early 2000s. These cases addressed the question of whether
trademark owners could be assumed to have consented to the
(unauthorized) importation of their products into the EEA after the
same products had been put into the market with trademark owners’
19
consent outside of the EEA. In both cases, the CJEU denied that

16. Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 71–83.
17. Case-173/98, Sebago, Inc. v. GB-Unic SA, 2 C.M.L.R. 1317 (1999).
18. Joined Cases C-414-416/99, Zino Davidoff SA v. A & G Imports Ltd., Levi Strauss
& Co. v. Tesco Stores Ltd., and Levi Strauss & Co. v. Costco Wholesale UK Ltd., 2001
E.C.R. I-8691.
19. Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 71–83. For
a criticism of these cases, see Irini A. Stamatoudi & Paul L.C. Torremans, International
Exhaustion in the European Union in the Light of “Zino Davidoff”: Contract Versus Trade
Mark Law?, 31 I.I.C. 123, 140 (2000); W. R. Cornish, Trade Marks: Portcullis for the EEA?,
[1998] E.I.P.R. 174, 176.
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trademark owners had consented to the importation of the goods into
the EEA even if they had consented to the distribution of the products
20
abroad.
In 2009, in Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel, the CJEU
addressed the meaning of “consent” under Article 7(1) again, this time
21
in the context of intra-EEA trade. To briefly summarize the facts,
Distributions Italian Fashion S.A., (Difsa), the distributor of Diesel
products in Spain, Portugal, and Andorra, granted Flexi Casual the
22
exclusive right to sell Diesel products in those countries.
Flexi,
however, without the approval of Difsa or Diesel, entered into a
separate licensing agreement with Cosmos World S.L. to distribute
Diesel products. Cosmos then sold Diesel shoes to Makro, who in turn
23
began selling the shoes in the Netherlands. Diesel brought suit against
Makro alleging copyright and trademark infringement on the grounds
that Diesel did not consent to Cosmos’ marketing of the shoes. Both
24
the Dutch trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Diesel.
Makro appealed to the Hoge Raad, asserting that Diesel’s trademark
rights were exhausted under Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive
because Cosmos had marketed the shoes in question with Diesel’s
25
consent. Unclear on how to proceed, the Hoge Raad referred to the
CJEU to clarify whether consent could be “implied” in “the case where
[the] goods . . . have first been placed on the market within the EEA,
26
but not by [the trademark owner himself] or with his express consent.”
Responding to the Hoge Raad’s question, the CJEU first repeated,
as it had pointed out in Sebago and Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss, that
27
consent “constitutes the decisive factor” when determining whether a
trademark owner’s rights are exhausted under Article 7, and that such
28
consent should be “unequivocally demonstrated.”
The Court also
indicated that, contrary to the facts in this case, consent “will normally
20.

Id. (citing Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. 539, at ¶ 31; Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. 1317, at ¶

22).
21. Case C-324/08, Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel CV v. Diesel SpA., 2009 E.C.R.
I-10019.
22. Id. at ¶ 8.
23. Id. at ¶ 11.
24. Id. at ¶ 14.
25. Id. at ¶ 15.
26. Makro, 2009 E.C.R. I-10019, at ¶ 17.
27. Id. at ¶ 22. See Amanda Easey & Rohan Massey, Parallel Imports: Consent by
Conduct, 3 J. Intell. Prop. Law & Prac. 642 (2008).
28. Id. (citing Case C-59/08, Copad, SA v. Christian Dior Couture SA, 2009 E.C.R I03421, ¶ 42).
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29

be gathered from an express statement.”
The CJEU admitted,
however, that in certain instances, such as in the presence of licensing
agreements, consent may be inferred “from the facts and circumstances
prior to, simultaneous with or subsequent to the placing of the goods on
the market in that area” when, in the view of the national court, these
facts and circumstances “unequivocally demonstrate that the proprietor
30
has renounced his exclusive rights.” Lastly, the Court observed that,
also in the case where the products were first distributed into an EEA
country, national courts could assess whether trademark owners had
“implicitly consented” to the first distribution of the goods (and
exhausted their trademark rights) by using the same test that the CJEU
had developed in Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss. National courts could
do so despite the fact that the CJEU developed that test with respect to
products, which were first marketed outside the EEA and later
31
imported into the EEA. Based upon this test, the Court seemed to
ultimately indicate that Diesel did not consent to Cosmos’ sale of Diesel
products to Makro, that Diesel’s trademark rights were not exhausted,
and that Diesel could legitimately oppose Makro’s sale in the
32
Netherlands.
B. Copad SA v. Christian Dior Couture SA
In 2009, the CJEU revisited what may constitute “consent” under
33
Article 7(1), also in Copad SA v. Christian Dior Couture SA. The main
focus of this case, however, was the interplay between the principle of
trademark exhaustion and the breach of a distribution clause in a
licensing agreement. Notably, this case dealt with whether this breach
of contract could, first, fall within the reasons to deny “trademark
owners’ consent” under Article 7(1) and, second, whether it could also
represent a “legitimate reason” to oppose the products’ further
34
distribution in the EEA under Article 7(2).
In this case, SIL, an
official licensee of Dior, sold luxury goods bearing the Christian Dior
trademark to Copad, a discount store chain outside of the distribution
network expressly defined in the license agreement between SIL and
29. Id. ¶ 24 (citing Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss, 2001 E.C.R. I-8691, ¶ 46; Copad,
2009 E.C.R. I-03421, at ¶ 42).
30. Id. at ¶ 23–25 (citing Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss, 2001 E.C.R. I-8691at ¶ 46).
31. Id. at ¶ 29.
32. Id. at ¶ 35.
33. Case C-59/08, Copad SA v. Christian Dior Couture SA, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421.
34. See id. at ¶ 14.
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36

Dior, and against Dior’s express denial to such sales. Arguing that
the licensing agreement expressly prohibited sales to discount stores in
37
order to “maintain the repute and prestige” of the mark, Dior brought
suit before the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Bobigny against both
38
The Tribunal held,
SIL and Copad for trademark infringement.
however, that the breach of the license agreement did not give rise to
liability for trademark infringement, but only to liability under a breach
39
of contract theory. Dior appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court on the finding that SIL’s actions only gave rise to
40
contractual liability. Still, the Court of Appeals found that SIL’s sales
to Copad did not imply exhaustion of Dior’s trademark rights for
41
purposes of Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive. Copad appealed
the finding of non-exhaustion to the Court of Cassation, and Dior cross42
appealed on the basis of infringement.
The Court of Cassation stayed proceedings and referred several
43
questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
Specifically, with
respect to Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive, the Court of
Cassation asked whether the fact that a licensee put “goods bearing a
trade mark on the market in the [EEA] in disregard of a provision of
the licensing agreement prohibiting, on grounds of the trade mark’s
prestige, sale to discount stores” needed to be interpreted as if the
licensee had sold the goods “without the consent” of the trademark
44
owner. Should that be the case, the Court of Cassation also asked,
“can the proprietor [then] invoke such a provision to oppose further
commercialization of the goods, on the basis of Article 7(2) of [the
45
Directive]?”
35. Id. at ¶¶ 9–10.
36. Id. at ¶ 9 (The original licensing agreement stated “in order to maintain the repute
and prestige of the trade mark the licensee agrees not to sell to wholesalers, buyers’
collectives, discount stores, mail order companies, door-to-door sales companies or
companies selling within private houses without prior written agreement from the licensor,
and must make all necessary provision to ensure that the rule is complied with by its
distributors or retailers.”).
37. Id. at ¶ 8.
38. Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at ¶ 12.
42. Id. at ¶ 13.
43. Id. at ¶ 14.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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The CJEU’s decision in this case marked one of the most important
victories for owners of luxury marks in the EU in recent years. In its
decision, the CJEU accepted that the allure and prestige of a mark, in
addition to the material elements of a product, can directly contribute to
46
the quality of the products. The CJEU affirmed, in particular, that the
breach of a licensing agreement, like the one between SIL and Dior,
could damage the “allure and prestigious image which bestows on those
goods an aura of luxury.” Notably, the Court stated that this breach of
contract could fall within the provisions enumerated in Article 8(2) of
the Trademark Directive, which lists the causes of action that trademark
47
owners can enforce against licensees. This finding impacted, in turn,
the Court’s answers on the interpretation of Article 7. In this respect,
the Court said that, generally, a licensee is considered as having put the
goods onto the market with the consent of the trademark owner. Yet,
the Court stated that if a licensee sells luxury goods in a manner that
breaches his licensing agreement, and such breach of contract falls
within Article 8(2) of the Directive, the general principle does not
apply, thus trademark owners’ rights cannot be considered exhausted
within the meaning of Article 7(1) because trademark owners did not
48
consent to the sale of the trademarked items. Furthermore, the CJEU
said that, with respect to the interpretation of Article 7(2), a licensee’s
breach of a contractual clause in the licensing agreement can qualify as a
“legitimate reason” under Article 7(2) to oppose future sales of the
trademarked good by a discount store if it can be established that the
49
resale would damage the reputation of the trademark. The Court did
not give specific guidance, however, as to how to determine such
damage to the reputation and left such determination to the national
50
courts on a case-by-case basis.
C. Coty Prestige Lancaster Group GmbH v. Simex Trading AG
One year later, in 2010, the CJEU again addressed a question
regarding the interpretation of “trademark owner’s consent” under
51
Article 7(1) in Coty Prestige Lancaster Group. This time, the Court
46. Id. at ¶¶ 24–26.
47. Id. at ¶ 30.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at ¶ 31.
51. Case C-127/09, Coty Prestige Lancaster Group GmbH v. Simex Trading AG, 2010
E.C.R. I-04965.
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specifically clarified the meaning of the language “putting on the market
52
[with trademark owner’s consent]” in that provision. In this case, Coty,
a perfume manufacturer, marketed its products through selective
53
distribution channels with “authorized specialist dealers” to whom
54
Coty provided marketing and advertising materials free of charge.
Coty expressly prohibited, however, any “commercial use on the part of
the authorized specialist dealer [of the materials], particular[ly] the sale
55
of samples, testers or miniatures.” Regardless of these contractual
clauses, Simex, a third party distributor, was able to provide two testers
of Coty’s perfumes to a retail store in Germany. These testers were
genuine perfumes, which had been packaged differently and had been
56
labeled with the wording “Demonstration” and “Not for Sale.” The
testers had been supplied to Simex by a within-network Coty dealer in
57
Singapore. Claiming that this unauthorized sale violated its trademark
rights, Coty sought an injunction against Simex in Germany on the basis
that the testers were put on the EEA market for the first time without
58
Coty’s consent. Against this claim, Simex asserted that the testers had
been put on the market with Coty’s consent, and that therefore Coty’s
59
rights were exhausted.
The trial court ruled in favor of Simex,
reasoning that Coty had transferred the testers to dealers, and thus had
60
granted its permission to use the perfumes. Coty appealed, and the
Court of Appeals referred to the CJEU a question to clarify the
meaning of the language “placement on the market” with “trademark
61
owner’s consent” under Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive.
The CJEU answered the question referred by the German Court of
62
Appeals by first repeating its conclusion in Sebago that under Article
7(1) trademark rights are considered exhausted not with respect to a
whole category of goods, but only with respect to the “individual items
of the product which have first been put on the market in the EEA by
52. Id. at ¶ 49.
53. Id. at ¶ 8.
54. Id. at ¶ 9.
55. Id.
56. Id. at ¶ 12.
57. Id. at ¶ 15.
58. Id.
59. Id. at ¶ 16.
60. Id. at ¶ 20.
61. Id. at ¶ 26.
62. Id. at ¶ 31 (citing Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. 1317 at ¶¶ 19–20); see also Calboli,
Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 71.
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63

the proprietor or with his consent.” The Court then analyzed whether
Coty’s rights in the particular products at issue were exhausted based
upon this general principle. Ultimately, the CJEU concluded that
Coty’s rights with regards to the products at issue were not exhausted.
The Court also repeated that, in abstract, “consent” for purpose of
trademark exhaustion under Article 7 can be either express or implied
from the circumstances. Yet the Court noted that consent can be
implied only if the circumstances unequivocally demonstrate that
trademark owners have renounced their right to be first to place the
64
goods onto the market in the EEA. In addition, the CJEU pointed out
that the issue of consent is one to be decided by the national courts. In
this case, the CJEU noted that a finding of consent was precluded due
to the fact that the testers’ bottles were clearly marked “not for sale,”
which unequivocally indicated that Coty did not consent to their sale
and thus precluded the possibility that Coty’s rights could be exhausted
65
under Article 7(1).
D. Portakabin Ltd. v. Primakabin, BV
Again in 2010, the CJEU dealt with another aspect of trademark
exhaustion and addressed the interplay between the principle of
exhaustion and the legal treatment of keyword advertising in the case
66
Portakabin Ltd. v. Primakabin, BV. Portakabin, a manufacturer of
mobile buildings, brought actions against Primakabin, a second-hand
dealer of mobile buildings, including those manufactured by Portakabin
67
in the Netherlands.
Through the Google AdWords service,
Primakabin purchased the words “portakabin,” “portacabin,”
“portokabin,” and “portocabin” to drive consumers to its website during
68
their Internet searches. The heading that accompanied the ad on the
69
Internet included the wording “used portakabins.” Portakabin sought
an order requiring Primakabin to cease using all signs similar to its
63. Coty Prestige, 2010 E.C.R. I-04965 at ¶ 31 (stating “neither the initial provision by
Coty Prestige of items of the goods at issue in the main proceedings to its authorized
specialist dealer established in Singapore nor the supply by Coty Prestige to its authorized
specialist dealers established in the EEA of other items of the same product may be
considered to be a putting on the market within the meaning of Article 7(1).”).
64. Id. at ¶ 38.
65. Id. at ¶ 43.
66. Case C-558/08, Portakabin Ltd. v. Primakabin BV, 2010 E.C.R. I-06959.
67. Id. at ¶ 13.
68. Id. at ¶ 16.
69. Id. at ¶ 17.
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mark, including all of the keywords that Primakabin had purchased for
70
use in the AdWords system. The Dutch trial court, however, found
that Primakabin had not used the word “portakabin” to distinguish
goods, and that Primakabin was not gaining an unfair advantage over
71
Portakabin by using any of the keywords that it had purchased.
Portakabin appealed. On appeal, the Dutch Court of Appeals
prohibited Primakabin from both engaging in advertising that contained
the words “used portakabins,” and from linking directly to its own
72
webpage through the use of variants of the word “portakabin.”
Portakabin appealed to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, which
stayed proceedings and referred questions to the CJEU for a
73
preliminary ruling. Among these questions, the Dutch Supreme Court
requested clarification on the application of Article 7 of the Trademark
Directive “where an offer by the advertiser . . . relates to goods which
have been marketed in the European Community [by the trademark
74
owner or with its consent].”
Responding to the question, the CJEU first repeated the general
principle that trademark rights are exhausted upon the first sale of the
75
products in the EEA by trademark owners or with their consent. The
Court then highlighted that the Portakabin mobile buildings had been
placed on the market in the EEA by Portakabin under its trademark,
and that the products were being further commercialized by
76
Primakabin. The Court also stated that trademark owners can oppose
the further commercialization of their products if there are “legitimate
77
reasons” to do so. In the case at issue the Court said, such “legitimate
reasons” could exist only if the advertiser’s use of a keyword identical or
similar to the trademark in question could seriously damage the
reputation of the mark. Otherwise, a trademark owner could not
prohibit an advertiser from using a keyword similar or identical to
78
his/her trademark. The CJEU also (unusually) gave specific directions
to the national courts that would rule on this and similar cases and

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at ¶ 18.
Id. at ¶ 20.
Id. at ¶ 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 74.
Id. at ¶ 76.
Trademark Directive, supra note 2, at art. 7(2).
Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. I-06959 at ¶ 78.
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stated that national courts cannot find a “legitimate reason” merely
based on the fact that an advertiser uses another’s trademark with
79
additional wording such as “used” or “second hand.”
The Court
observed, however, that national courts are obligated to find a
“legitimate reason” where the reseller has used a keyword similar or
identical to a trademark and has removed or concealed the trademark
80
from the goods. Still, the Court added that national courts must find
that “specialist” retailers (such as retailers of “used portakabins”)
cannot be prohibited from using a mark for the purpose of advertising
81
its resale activities which include the sale of other second-hand goods,
unless selling the other second-hand goods would risk seriously
82
damaging the image or reputation of the mark.
E. L’Oreal v. eBay
Most recently, in 2011, the CJEU once again dealt with the issue of
cosmetics that were marked “not for sale” as in Coty Prestige, in the
83
case L’Oreal v. eBay, this time in the context of unauthorized sales in
84
EBay, a famous online auction house,
the online marketplace.
operates an online marketplace where goods are offered for sale and
85
bought by third party eBay customers. In the case at issue, several of
L’Oreal’s products were placed for sale on eBay. Among these items
were products that, although not meant for sale in the EEA, eventually
86
entered into the EEA without the consent of L’Oreal. As a general
practice, L’Oreal uses a selective distribution network and controls its
87
sales by means of contracts with authorized distributors. Because of
these unauthorized sales on eBay, L’Oreal sent eBay a letter in 2007
expressing its concerns regarding the sale of infringing products on
eBay’s site, and requested that eBay take steps to investigate these
88
concerns. Unsatisfied with eBay’s response, L’Oreal brought an action

79. Id. at ¶¶ 89–91.
80. Id. at ¶ 93.
81. Id.
82. Id. See also Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421, at ¶ 24.
83.
Case
C-324/09,
L’Oreal
SA
v.
eBay,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09.
84. Id. at ¶ 1.
85. Id. at ¶ 2.
86. Id. at ¶ 28.
87. Id. at ¶ 27.
88. Id. at ¶ 32.

available

at
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before the High Court of Justice of England and Wales in order to
89
obtain a ruling that eBay users had infringed its trademarks, and that
90
eBay was jointly liable for the infringement. The High Court stayed
proceedings and referred several questions to the CJEU. Among these
questions, the High Court asked the CJEU to clarify the application of
Article 7(1) to this case, in particular with respect to the language “put
in the market,” and to clarify the application of Article 7(2) and the
interpretation of the language “legitimate reasons” to oppose trademark
91
exhaustion with respect to online marketplaces such as eBay.
In July 2011, the CJEU issued its decision on the case. With respect
to the question related to the interpretation of Article 7(1) and the
meaning of the language “put in the market,” the Court repeated its
holding in Coty Prestige where it stated that the products at issue were
92
not “put on the market” within the meaning of Article 7(1).
Specifically, the Court stated that under Article 7(1), if the goods are
clearly marked “not for sale,” trademark owners’ rights cannot be
considered exhausted even if the products have been first distributed
93
within the EEA. In addition, the Court stated that trademark owners
could rely on Article 7(2) and oppose further sales of their products if
the boxes or outer packaging of the products have been removed or
94
replaced, when such removal may affect “essential information,” such
as in the case where “information relating to the identity of the
manufacturer or the person responsible for marketing the cosmetic
95
product is missing” or when “the removal of the packaging has
damaged the image of the product and, hence, the trade mark’s
96
reputation.”
Yet, the Court also stated that the finding of such
“legitimate reasons” to oppose further commercialization of the goods
remains dependent on the specific facts of the case, and did not directly
elaborate on any example where L’Oreal’s image could likely be
97
damaged.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at ¶¶ 34–35.
Id. at ¶ 36.
Id. at ¶¶ 43–44.
Id. at ¶ 65.
Id. at ¶ 72.
Id. at ¶ 83.
Id. at ¶ 81.
Id. at ¶ 83.
Id.
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F. Joined Cases Orifarm AS and Paranova AS v. Merck Sharp &
Dohme
Finally, in July 2011, the CJEU again addressed the interpretation of
Article 7(2) of the Trademark Directive in the joined cases of Orifarm
98
and Paranova. Both cases were referred by the Danish Supreme Court
and concerned the question of whether trademark rights are infringed
when a pharmaceutical product is imported by a company under
authorization, but the importing company asks a third party to
repackage the products, even if it ultimately lists itself as the
99
repackaging company on the products’ packages. In particular, in the
cases at issue, Merck sued Orifarm and Paranova in Denmark alleging
trademark infringement because the companies had wrongly identified
themselves as the repackagers of the products in question and, as a
100
result, Merck’s consumers could be misled.
Merck argued that
although Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive prohibits trademark
owners to further control the distribution of their products after their
first sale in the market, Article 7(2) provides an exception to this rule
based upon the existence of “a legitimate reason.” According to Merck,
the failure to disclose the identity of the actual repackager constituted
101
such a “legitimate reason.”
In the Orifarm case, the Danish district
102
Similarly, in the Paranova case, the
court ruled in favor of Merck.
same court granted an injunction prohibiting Paranova from selling the
products in question where the packaging did not accurately reflect the
103
identity of the repackager.
Both decisions were appealed to the
Supreme Court, which in both instances referred a question to the
104
CJEU.
Interestingly, the CJEU disagreed with the Danish district court and
held that defendants had not infringed Merck’s marks simply because
105
defendants had failed to disclose the identity of the repackager. The
Court mentioned some of its previous decisions in which it specified that

98. Joined Cases C-400/09 and C-207/10, Orifarm v. Merck and Paranova v. Merck,
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0400:EN:HTML.
99.
Id. at ¶ 1.
100. Id.
101. Id. at ¶ 22.
102. Id. at ¶ 11.
103. Id. at ¶ 17.
104. Id. at ¶ 12.
105. Id. at ¶ 36.
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one of the conditions under which a parallel importer should repackage
pharmaceutical products was, in fact, that the new packaging clearly
indicates the repackager of the product and the name of the
106
manufacturer. Still, in the cases at issue, the CJEU rejected Merck’s
argument that consumers have an interest in knowing the name of the
107
actual repackager of the products.
Notably, the CJEU stressed that
the provision of Article 7(2)—the legitimate reason to oppose the
exhaustion of trademark rights—is designed to protect exclusively the
interest of trademark owners, and not the consumers. Instead, the
consumers should rely upon other legal instruments to protect their
108
In these cases the Court found trademark owners’ rights
interests.
were sufficiently protected by the possibility of holding the repackager
of the product or the distributor liable if the original condition of the
product was affected by the repackaging or the repackaging was likely
109
to damage the reputation of the mark. To the contrary, in the absence
of any material changes to the original conditions of the products, the
CJEU concluded that trademark owners cannot object to the parallel
import of repackaged pharmaceutical products based only on the fact
that the company listed as importer may have instructed a sister
110
company to effect the logistics of the repackaging in practice.
III. EEA-WIDE TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION UNDER ATTACK?
As the decisions summarized above demonstrate, the interpretation
of Article 7 of the Trademark Directive and the application of the
principle of trademark exhaustion in the EU continues to be the subject
111
of heated debates and controversies.
Different from the debates of
the late 1990s, however, national courts seem to have accepted as a fait

106. Id. at ¶ 27 (citing Case C-276/05, The Wellcome Foundation, Ltd. v. Paranova,
2008 E.C.R. I-10479; Case C-348/04, Boehringer v. Swingward, Ltd., 2007 E.C.R. I-03391).
107. Id. at ¶¶ 34–35.
108. Id. at ¶ 33.
109. Id.
110. Id. at ¶ 36.
111. See Orifarm & Paranova, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0400:
EN:HTML;
L’Oreal,
available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09; Coty Prestige, 2010 E.C.R.
I-04965; Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. I-06959; Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421; Makro, 2009 E.C.R. I10019. See also Eike Ullmann, Reconciling Trade Mark Decisions of National Courts and the
European Court of Justice, 27 I.I.C. 791 (1996); INGE GOVAERE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN E.C. LAW 157 (1996); Ulrich Löwenheim, Intellectual
Property Before the European Court of Justice, 26 I.I.C. 829 (1995).
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accompli that trademark exhaustion in the EEA only applies after the
first authorized sale of the products in one of the EEA Member
112
States.
Instead, in recent years, national courts primarily asked the
CJEU to clarify the meaning of the notion of “trademark owner’s
consent [to the distribution of the products in the EEA]” in the
113
language of Article 7(1), and to elaborate on what represents a
“legitimate reason” to oppose the further circulation of the marked
products even after the first sale in the EEA market against the
application of the principle of trademark exhaustion under Article
114
7(2).
Nevertheless, the analysis of the recent jurisprudence of the CJEU
continues to raise serious concerns as to the future application of the
principle of trademark exhaustion, even with respect to intra-EEA
parallel trade. Particularly, the recent jurisprudence of the CJEU in this
area seems to indicate that the CJEU has consistently adopted an
increasingly narrow interpretation of the language of Article 7 of the
Trademark Directive.
This narrow interpretation is effectively
shrinking the application of the principle of trademark exhaustion even
115
with respect to products legitimately distributed in the EEA.
Specifically, in its recent decisions, the CJEU seem to have accepted an
interpretation of the notion of trademark owners’ “consent” under
Article 7(1) that may prevent courts from finding that trademark
owners have “consented” to the distribution of their products into the
EEA (and have exhausted their trademark rights with respect to those
products), unless trademark owners have given their “express and
116
unequivocal” consent to such distribution.
Additionally, the recent
jurisprudence of the CJEU seems to indicate that the CJEU has
adopted an ever broader interpretation of what can constitute a
112. See discussion supra Introduction.
113. See
L’Oreal,
available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09; Coty Prestige, 2010 E.C.R. I-04965; Copad, 2009
E.C.R. I-03421, Makro, 2009 E.C.R. I-10019.
114. See
Orifarm
&
Paranova,
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0400: EN:HTML; L’Oreal, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09; Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I03241.
115. See discussion supra Part II.
116. See
Orifarm
&
Paranova
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0400: EN:HTML; L’Oreal, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09; Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. I06959; Coty Prestige, 2010 E.C.R. I-04965; Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03241; Makro, 2009 E.C.R. I10019.
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“legitimate reason” to oppose the further commercialization of the
marked products after the first sale in the EEA under Article 7(2), and
thus trademark exhaustion. This is particularly pertinent in instances
where trademark owners wish to protect famous marks and luxury
117
goods against unauthorized parallel trade.
Most notably, with respect to the questions over the interpretation
of “consent” under Article 7(1), the CJEU has repeated, at first, the
position that it previously articulated in the cases Sebago and Zino
118
Davidoff and Levi Strauss. The Court has noted that consent cannot
be inferred or implied from the fact that the goods in question do not
carry ad hoc labels that prohibit their resale in the EEA, or by the fact
that trademark owners do not expressly impose contractual restrictions
119
outside the EEA prohibiting the re-sale of the goods in the EEA.
Along the same lines, the CJEU has specified that the fact of making
“testers” available to dealers could not be interpreted as if trademark
owners had consented to the subsequent sale of those testers,
120
particularly when the testers were marked “not for sale.”
More
problematic, the CJEU has also stated that the notion of consent under
Article 7(1) can extend to acts carried out by licensees or by entities
economically linked to trademark owners. Specifically, the Court has
accepted that a licensee’s breach of a distribution clause in a licensing
agreement can be considered as if the trademark owner had not given
her consent under Article 7(1) to the distribution of the products,
despite the fact that the products had been provided to the licensee
directly by the trademark owner and that the products were distributed
121
under the licensing agreement.
Not surprisingly, the Court has
developed this line of reasoning in cases dealing with luxury goods.
Notably, the Court said, if a licensee sells luxury goods in a manner that

117. See Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421, at ¶¶ 25–26 (stating “[s]ince luxury goods are
high-class goods, the aura of luxury emanating from them is essential in that it enables
customers to distinguish them from similar goods. Therefore, an impairment to that aura of
luxury is likely to affect the actual quality of those goods . . . it follows that it is conceivable
that the sale of luxury goods by the licensee to third parties that are not part of the selective
distribution network might affect the quality itself of those goods.”).
118. See Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss, 2001 E.C.R. I-8691; Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. 1317.
119. Makro, 2009 E.C.R. I-10019; Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421; Coty Prestige, 2010
E.C.R.
I-04965;
L’Oreal,
available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09.
120.
See
L’Oreal,
available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09; Coty Prestige, 2010 E.C.R. I-04965.
121. Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421.
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breaches his licensing agreement, such breach of contract can preempt
the application of the principle of trademark exhaustion because
trademark owners did not consent to the sale of the trademarked items
122
under Article 7(1).
Ultimately, the CJEU has merged principles of
contract law with the application of the principle of trademark
exhaustion to deny that trademark rights are exhausted when licensees
of luxury goods sell the products to “gray marketers” in violation of a
distribution clause (expressed or possibly just implied) in the licensing
agreement. By adopting this position, however, the CJEU has severely
weakened the effectiveness of the principle of trademark exhaustion
and de facto jeopardized its application in the majority of cases dealing
with gray market products distributed in the market.
Equally problematic, the CJEU has expanded the number of
grounds that may constitute “legitimate reasons” to oppose the further
commercialization of the products after their first sale under Article
123
7(2), even if such sale took place in the EEA.
Once again, this
expansion has invariably benefitted trademark owners, particularly the
owners of famous and luxury marks. In this respect, the CJEU has
repeated, at first, that trademark owners can oppose this further
commercialization of their products under Article 7(2) when the
124
material condition of the goods has been changed or impaired. This
would be the case, the Court said, if importers removed the product’s
serial or identification numbers that had been applied to the products
for legitimate purposes (not solely to prevent gray market products), or
if the marked products have been repackaged by importers, apart from
the cases of (pharmaceutical) products where the name of the

122. Id. at ¶ 51 (stating “Article 7(1) of the Directive is to be interpreted as meaning
that a licensee who puts goods bearing a trade mark on the market in disregard of a provision
in a license agreement does so without the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark where
it is established that the provision in question is included in those listed in Article 8(2) of that
Directive”).
123. Trademark Directive, supra note 2, at art. 7(2).
124. For previous decisions of the CJEU on the interpretation of Article 7(2), see also
Joined Cases C-427, C-429 & C-436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S, 1996 E.C.R. I3457, I-3536–45; Case C-379/97, Pharmacia & Upjohn SA v. Paranova A/S, 1999 E.C.R. I6927; Case C-349/95, Loendersloot v. Ballantine & Son Ltd., 1997 E.C.R. I-6227; Case C143/00, Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-3759; Case C-348/04,
Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., 2007 E.C.R. I-03391; Case C- 276/05, Wellcome
Found. Ltd. v. Paranova Parmazeutika Handels GmbH, 2008 E.C.R. I-10479; see also Ansgar
Only, Trade Marks and Parallel Importation—Recent Developments in European Law, 30
I.I.C. 521, 516 (1999); Paul Torremans, New Repackaging Under the Trade Mark Directive of
Well-established Exhaustion Principles, 11 E.I.P.R. 664 (1997).
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repackaging company (or of the importing company which is controlling
the repackaging company) is stated on the packaging and the actual
125
quality of the products has not been altered.
The Court has
additionally stated, however, that “de-branding”—the removal of the
trademark from the products—can amount to a “legitimate reason” for
trademark owners to object to the further commercialization of the
126
products under Article 7(2).
Most problematically, the Court has
indicated that trademark rights have not been exhausted, and trademark
owners can oppose the further circulation of the goods when the use of
the mark by the reseller could seriously damage the reputation of the
127
mark. According to the Court, this can occur, for example, when the
products are sold without authorization in discounted stores, if such
128
sales can affect the “aura of luxury” and exclusivity of the products.
Similarly, the Court has stated that, while resellers can legitimately use
the marks without the authorization of trademark owners to advertise
129
their businesses, trademark owners can again oppose such advertising
under Article 7(2) when it can affect the “aura of luxury” and
130
exclusivity of the products.
Not surprisingly, trademark owners, in particular the owners of
125. In Loendersloot, 1997 E.C.R. I-6227, the CJEU said that importers could remove
labels when these labels had been placed by trademark owners simply to control distribution
and prevent parallel imports. See also Orafarm and Paranova, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0400:EN:HTML
(stating
“the new packaging must indicate clearly the repackager of the product, that requirement is
justified by the trade mark proprietor’s interest in the consumer or end user not being let to
believe that the proprietor is responsible for the repackaging.”).
126. Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. I-06959, at ¶ 93 (stating “the national court . . . is obliged
to find that there is such a legitimate reason where the reseller, without the consent of the
proprietor . . . has removed reference to that trade mark from the goods, manufactured and
placed on the market by that proprietor, and replaced it with a label bearing the reseller’s
name, thereby concealing the trade mark”).
127. Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-3421 (stating that a trademark owner may oppose the
unauthorized sale of luxury goods to discount stores by a licensee if the sale could damage the
reputation of the mark). But see Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV,
1997 E.C.R. I-6013 (where the CJEU applied, a few years earlier, trademark exhaustion to
the use of trademarks in advertising). See also Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. I-06959, at ¶ 93
(stating “the national court . . . is obliged to find that a specialist reseller of second-hand
goods under another person’s trade mark cannot be prohibited from using that mark to
advertise . . . resale activities . . . unless the resale of those other goods . . . risks seriously
damaging the image which the proprietor has succeeded in creating for its mark.”).
128. Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421, at ¶ 60.
129. Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. I-06959, at ¶ 93.
130. Id. at ¶ 84. See also Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421; Case C-63/97, BMW v. Deenik,
1999 E.C.R. I-00905, ¶¶ 50–55.
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famous and luxury marks, have welcomed the CJEU’s recent decisions
in this area. With the exception of the cases related to the repackaging
and distribution of pharmaceutical products, the CJEU’s recent
decisions clearly indicate, in fact, that the Court is increasingly willing to
narrow the interpretation of the principle of trademark exhaustion to
protect famous marks and marks identifying luxury products. Most
relevantly, the Court seems increasingly willing to grant to luxury marks
owners the ability to exert additional control over the distribution of
their products within the EEA and ultimately prevent gray market
products even within the EEA as long as trademark owners can prove
that the unauthorized distribution of these products can affect the image
and reputation of the marks. Hence, although certainly greeted by
trademark owners, these decisions are an unwelcome development in
the jurisprudence of the CJEU and a clear threat for the correct
functioning of the free movement of products in the EU/EEA.
Moreover, these decisions directly go against the historical justifications
of the principle of trademark exhaustion. First, products should be free
to circulate into the market after their first sale because trademark
owners have already realized the economic value with respect to those
products. Second, trademark owners’ exclusive rights should be
balanced with the proprietary rights of the buyers of the marked
products, who should be allowed to resell or otherwise freely dispose of
131
their properties after they have lawfully acquired them.
Ultimately,
these decisions are contrary to the historical justifications for trademark
protection, which focuses on protecting consumers against confusion
132
and competitors against unfair competition, and only indirectly
protects trademark owners’ goodwill.
Against the position that “[t]rademark law . . . has never protected
the ability of trademark owners to design the condition under which

131. For an analysis of the theoretical foundation of the principle of trademark
exhaustion, see TIMOTHY H. HIEBERT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION IN U.S. TRADEMARK
LAW 1 (1994); Heath, supra note 15, at 623; Hilke, supra note 15, at 75; Charles Worth, Free
Trade Agreements and the Exhaustion of Rights Principle, 1 E.I.P.R. 40 (1994).
132. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987) (“[T]rademark law . . . can best be explained
on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency.”); see also Nicholas S.
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 526 (1988); William
P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 199,
205 (1991); Anselm Kamperman Sanders & Spyros M. Maniatis, A Consumer Trade Mark:
Protection Based on Origin and Quality, 11 E.I.P.R. 406 (1993).
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133

products are released into the market,” the CJEU’s recent decisions
favor, instead, the corporate view that trademark law should protect
primarily, if not exclusively, business goodwill, rather than consumers
and market competition. This conclusion seems particularly true with
respect to the CJEU’s decisions where the products at issue were sold
under marks whose business success depends on an “aura of luxury”
and exclusivity, which can be affected by the unauthorized sale of the
134
products in discount stores. If confirmed in future decisions, however,
this line of reasoning from the CJEU would directly amount to overly
rewarding trademark owners to the detriment of competition in the
marketplace, which could result, in turn, in increased market prices for
135
luxury products. Ultimately, whether luxury products are bought in a
high-end store or in a discount store, as long as the quality of the
products has not been materially altered, products remain the same
(apart from the variations in market price in the different stores).
Likewise, the marks that identify the products continue to perform the
traditional and legally protected trademark functions—indicating
commercials origin and guaranteeing consistent products quality—
regardless of the fact that the products are sold in different types of
stores. As Professor Sir Robin Jacob (formerly Lord Justice of the
Court of Appeal of England and Wales) said, “[s]ometime[s] [it seems]
that the law may be losing a sense of reality in this area—we are, after
all, only considering the use of the owners’ trademark for his goods in
136
perfect condition.”
Undoubtedly, as Professor Sir Jacob observed,
“[t]he pickle the law has got into [in this area] would . . . astonish the
137
average consumer,” and this is certainly most unfortunate and should
be considered highly problematic for consumers, market competition,
133. Calboli, supra note 4, at 1250 (citing Beier, supra note 15, at 61–62).
134. Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421, at ¶ 60. In general, with respect to the risks of
shifting trademark protection in favor of protecting trademarks per se, see also Gert-Jan Van
De Kamp, Protection of Trade Marks: The New Regime – Beyond Origin?, 1998 E.I.P.R. 364;
Helen Norman, Perfume, Whisky and Leaping Cats of Prey: A U.K. Perspective on Three
Recent Trade Mark Cases Before the European Court of Justice, 1998 E.I.P.R. 306 (1998);
Paul Walsh et al., Parallel Imports: Labelling and Advertising Trademarked Products,
TRADEMARK WORLD, Feb. 1998, at 20.
135. See, e.g., Beier, Territoriality of Trademark Law, supra note 15, at 72 (“[T]hese
economic interests are not protected by trademark law. They can only be considered within
the framework of the law against unfair competition, by contract law, and the law of torts.”).
136. Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 3, ¶ 78. The
Court of Appeal of England and Wales referred this case to the CJEU. See Case C-348/04,
Boehringer Ingelheim KG and Others v. Swingward Ltd and Others, [2007] ECR I-03391.
137. Boehringer Ingelheim, [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 3, ¶ 78.
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and the free movement of products in the EEA.
IV. CONCLUSION
In my 2002 article, I concluded by saying that there was “little hope
left for those who favor International exhaustion in the EU” after the
decisions of the CJEU on the interpretation of the geographical
application of Article 7(1). Ten years later, I conclude this Essay by
saying that the recent decisions of the CJEU go even further than
simply confirming the principle of EEA-wide exhaustion as the
exclusive criterion to apply to trademark exhaustion in the EEA.
Notably, these decisions seem to indicate the willingness of the Court to
interpret the application of the principle of trademark exhaustion
restrictively, even with respect to intra-EEA parallel trade. In
particular, the CJEU seems to have adopted an increasingly narrow
interpretation of the notion of “consent” under Article 7(1) and has
consistently ruled that without trademark owners’ “unequivocally
expressed consent,” products cannot be considered legitimately
distributed into the EEA (and trademark rights cannot be considered
exhausted). Most problematically, the CJEU has clearly sided with the
owners of luxury trademarks, and has stated that trademark owners can
oppose the further distribution of their products under the rule of
Article 7(2), even after the first sale of these products in the EEA, when
parallel importers distribute these products in ways that may detriment
the image and the prestige of the products and trademark owners.
In a world where corporations are vociferously opposing gray
market products in order to prevent the arbitrage of consumer goods
across different jurisdictions, or simply through unauthorized retail
chains and distributors in the same EEA jurisdiction, these
jurisprudential developments barely come as a surprise. Still, this
judicial trend is unwelcome. Trademark owners have always desired to
control the distribution of their marked products after their first sale in
the market, yet trademark law and policy have never intended to grant
trademark owners this control. The principle of trademark exhaustion
specifically opposes this control. Even before the adoption of the
Trademark Directive and Article 7, European law makers and the
CJEU carefully balanced the exercise of the exclusive rights of
trademark owners with the principle of free movement of goods in the
European internal market by recurring at first, to European competition
law provisions, and then to the provisions protecting the free movement
of products in the EU. Hence, the CJEU’s shift towards narrowing the
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interpretation of “trademark owners’ consent” under Article 7(1), and
in favor of broadening the interpretation of “legitimate reasons” under
Article 7(2), directly stifles the application of the principle of trademark
exhaustion under Article 7, even within the EEA. Ultimately, such shift
is unwelcome as it goes against the letter, the legislative history, and the
spirit of Article 7. Moreover, it negatively impacts the free movement
of products within the EEA and overly rewards trademark owners to
the detriment of consumers and market competition, even after
trademark owners have already realized the commercial value of their
marks with the first sale of the marked products in the EEA.

